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ABSTRACT
On August 22, 1999, we completed the factorization of the 512{bit 155{digit number RSA{155 with the
help of the Number Field Sieve factoring method (NFS). This is a new record for factoring general numbers.
Moreover, 512{bit RSA keys are frequently used for the protection of electronic commerce|at least outside
the USA|so this factorization represents a breakthrough in research on RSA{based systems.
The previous record, factoring the 140{digit number RSA{140, was established on February 2, 1999, also
with the help of NFS, by a subset of the team which factored RSA{155. The amount of computing time spent
on RSA{155 was about 8400 MIPS years, roughly four times that needed for RSA{140; this is about half of
what could be expected from a straightforward extrapolation of the computing time spent on factoring RSA{
140 and about a quarter of what would be expected from a straightforward extrapolation of the computing
time spent on RSA{130. The speed-up is due to a new polynomial selection method for NFS of Murphy and
Montgomery which was applied for the rst time to RSA{140 and now, with improvements, to RSA{155.
2000 Mathematics Subject Classication: Primary 11Y05. Secondary 11A51.
1999 ACM Computing Classication System: F.2.1.
Keywords and Phrases: public-key cryptosystems, RSA, factoring, number eld sieve.
Note: The research of Cavallar, Lioen, Montgomery, and Te Riele was carried out under project MAS2.2
\Computational number theory and data security".
A slightly abridged version of this report will appear in the Proceedings of Eurocrypt 2000, Bruges (Brugge),
Belgium, May 14{18, 2000. URL: http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/eurocrypt2000/ .
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1. Introduction
After the birth, in 1977, of the public-key cryptosystem RSA [36], knowledge of the state-
of-the-art of factoring large numbers has become crucial for RSA{based cryptographic ap-
plications. Since then, major algorithmic progress was marked by the publication of the
Quadratic Sieve [34] in 1985, the Elliptic Curve algorithm [25] in 1987, and the Number
Field Sieve in 1990 [20]. The largest factored (dicult) numbers were registered carefully,
and reports of new records were invariably presented at cryptographic conferences. We men-
tion Eurocrypt '89 (C100
1
[22]), Eurocrypt '90 (C107 and C116 [23]), Crypto '93 (C120, [13]),
Asiacrypt '94 (C129, [2]), Asiacrypt '96 (C130, [11]), and Asiacrypt '99 (C140, [8]). The C130
and C140 were factored with help of the Number Field Sieve (NFS), the other numbers were
factored using the Quadratic Sieve (QS). For additional information, implementations and
previous large NFS factorizations, see [15, 16, 17, 19, 32].
This paper reports on the factorization of RSA{155 by NFS and the implications for RSA.
The number RSA{155 was taken from the RSA Challenge list [37] as a representative 512{bit
RSA modulus. Section 2 discusses the implications of this project for the practical use of
RSA{based cryptosystems. Section 3 has the details of our computations which resulted in
the factorization of RSA{155.
2. Implications for the practice of RSA
RSA is widely used today [18]. The best size for an RSA key depends on the security needs
of the user and on how long his/her information needs to be protected.
The amount of CPU time spent to factor RSA{155 was about 8400 MIPS years
2
which is
about four times that used for the factorization of RSA{140. On the basis of the heuristic
complexity formula [7] for factoring large N by NFS:
exp

(1:923 + o(1)) (logN)
1=3
(log logN)
2=3

; (2.1)
one would expect an increase in the computing time by a factor of about seven.
3
This speed-
up has been made possible by algorithmic improvements, mainly in the polynomial generation
step [28, 31, 32], and to a lesser extent in the lter step of NFS [9].
The complete project to factor RSA{155 took seven calendar months. The polynomial
generation step took about one month on several fast workstations. The most time-consuming
step, the sieving, was done on about 300 fast PCs and workstations spread over twelve \sites"
in six countries. This step took 3.7 calendar months, in which, summed over all these 300
computers, a total of 35.7 years of CPU-time was consumed. Filtering the relations and
building and reducing the matrix corresponding to these relations took one calendar month
and was carried out on an SGI Origin 2000 computer. The block Lanczos step to nd
1
By \Cxxx" we denote a composite number having xxx decimal digits.
2
One MIPS year is the equivalent of a computation during one full year at a sustained speed of oneMillion
Instructions Per Second.
3
By \computing time" we mean the sieve time, which dominates the total amount of CPU time for NFS.
However, there is a trade-o between polynomial search time and sieve time which indicates that a non-trivial
part of the total amount of computing time should be spent to the polynomial search time in order to minimize
the sieve time. See Subsection Polynomial Search Time vs. Sieving Time in Section 3.1. When we use (2.1) for
predicting CPU times, we neglect the o(1){term, which, in fact, is proportional to 1= log(N). All logarithms
have base e.
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dependencies in this matrix took about ten calendar days on one CPU of a Cray C916
supercomputer. The nal square root step took about two days calendar time on an SGI
Origin 2000 computer.
Based on our experience with factoring large numbers we estimate that within three
years the algorithmic and computer technology which we used to factor RSA{155 will be
widespread, at least in the scientic world, so that by then 512{bit RSA keys will certainly
not be safe any more. This makes these keys useless for authentication or for the protection
of data required to be secure for a period longer than a few days.
512{bit RSA keys protect 95% of today's E-commerce on the Internet [38]|at least outside
the USA|and are used in SSL (Secure Socket Layer) handshake protocols. Underlying this
undesirable situation are the old export restrictions imposed by the USA government on
products and applications using \strong" cryptography like RSA. However, on January 12,
2000, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) issued new
encryption export regulations which allow U.S. companies to use larger than 512{bit keys in
RSA{based products [41]. As a result, one may replace 512{bit keys by 768{bit or even 1024{
bit keys thus creating much more favorable conditions for secure Internet communication.
In order to make an extrapolation attempt, we give a table of factoring records starting
with the landmark factorization in 1970 by Morrison and Brillhart of F
7
= 2
128
+1 with help
of the then new Continued Fraction (CF) method. This table includes the complete list of
factored RSA{numbers, although RSA{100 and RSA{110 were not absolute records at the
time they were factored. Notice that RSA{150 is still open. Some details on recent factoring
records are given in Appendix 1 to this paper.
Table 1: Factoring records since 1970
# decimals date algorithm eort reference
or year (MIPS years)
39 Sep 13, 1970 CF F
7
= 2
2
7
+ 1 [29, 30]
50 1983 CF [6, pp. xliv{xlv]
55{71 1983{1984 QS [12, Table I on p. 189]
45{81 1986 QS [39, p. 336]
78{90 1987{1988 QS [40]
87{92 1988 QS [35, Table 3 on p. 274]
93{102 1989 QS [22]
107{116 1990 QS 275 for C116 [23]
RSA{100 Apr 1991 QS 7 [37]
RSA{110 Apr 1992 QS 75 [14]
RSA{120 Jun 1993 QS 835 [13]
RSA{129 Apr 1994 QS 5000 [2]
RSA{130 Apr 1996 NFS 1000 [11]
RSA{140 Feb 1999 NFS 2000 [8]
RSA{155 Aug 1999 NFS 8400 this paper
Based on this table and on the factoring algorithms which we currently know, we anticipate
that within ten years from now 768{bit (232{digit) RSA keys will become unsafe.
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Let D be the number of decimal digits in the largest \general" number factored by a given
date. From the complexity formula for NFS (2.1), assuming Moore's law (computing power
doubles every 18 months), Brent [5] expects D
1=3
to be roughly a linear function of the
calendar year Y . From the data in Table 1 he derives the linear formula
Y = 13:24D
1=3
+ 1928:6:
According to this formula, a general 768{bit number (D=231) will be factored by the year
2010, and a general 1024{bit number (D=309) by the year 2018.
Directions for selecting cryptographic key sizes now and in the coming years are given in
[24].
The vulnerability of a 512{bit RSA modulus was predicted long ago. A 1991 report [3, p.
81] recommends:
For the most applications a modulus size of 1024 bit for RSA should achieve a
sucient level of security for \tactical" secrets for the next ten years. This is
for long-term secrecy purposes, for short-term authenticity purposes 512 bit might
suce in this century.
3. Factoring RSA{155
We assume that the reader is familiar with NFS [20], but for convenience we briey describe
the method here. Let N be the number we wish to factor, known to be composite. There
are four main steps in NFS: polynomial selection, sieving, linear algebra, and square root.
The polynomial selection step selects two irreducible polynomials f
1
(x) and f
2
(x) with a
common rootm mod N . The polynomials have as many smooth values as practically possible
over a given factor base.
The sieve step (which is by far the most time-consuming step of NFS), nds pairs (a; b)
with gcd(a; b) = 1 such that both
b
deg(f
1
)
f
1
(a=b) and b
deg(f
2
)
f
2
(a=b)
are smooth over given factor bases, i.e., factor completely over the factor bases. Such a pair
(a; b) is called a relation. The purpose of this step is to collect so many relations that several
subsets S of them can be found with the property that a product taken over S yields an
expression of the form
X
2
 Y
2
(mod N): (3.1)
For approximately half of these subsets, computing gcd(X   Y;N) yields a non-trivial factor
of N (if N has exactly two distinct factors).
The linear algebra step rst lters the relations found during sieving, with the purpose of
eliminating duplicate relations and relations containing a prime or prime ideal which does
not occur elsewhere. In addition, certain relations are merged with the purpose of eliminating
primes and prime ideals which occur exactly k times in k dierent relations, for k = 2; : : : ; 8.
These merges result in so-called relation{sets, dened in Section 3.3, which form the columns
of a very large sparse matrix over F
2
. With help of an iterative block Lanczos algorithm a
few dependencies are found in this matrix: this is the most time{ and space{consuming part
of the linear algebra step.
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The square root step computes the square root of an algebraic number of the form
Y
(a;b)2S
(a  b);
where  is a root of one of the polynomials f
1
(x); f
2
(x), and where for RSA{155 the numbers
a, b and the cardinality of the set S can all be expected to be many millions. All a   b's
have smooth norms. With the mapping  7! m mod N , this leads to a congruence of the
form (3.1).
In the next four subsections, we describe these four steps, as carried out for the factorization
of RSA{155.
3.1 Polynomial selection
This section has three parts. The rst two parts are aimed at recalling the main details of
the polynomial selection procedure, and describing the particular polynomials used for the
RSA{155 factorization.
Relatively speaking, our selection for RSA{155 is approximately 1.7 times better than our
selection for RSA{140. We made better use of our procedure for RSA{155 than we did for
RSA{140, in short by searching longer. This poses a new question for NFS factorizations|
what is the optimal trade-o between increased polynomial search time and the corresponding
saving in sieve time? The third part of this section gives preliminary consideration to this
question as it applies to RSA{155.
The Procedure Our polynomial selection procedure is outlined in [8]. Here we merely restate
the details. Recall that we generate two polynomials f
1
and f
2
, using a base-m method. The
degree d of f
1
is xed in advance (for RSA{155 we take d = 5). Given a potential a
5
, we
choose an integer m  (N=a
d
)
1=d
. The polynomial
f
1
(x) = a
d
x
d
+ a
d 1
x
d 1
+ : : :+ a
0
(3.2)
descends from the base-m representation of N , initially adjusted so that ja
i
j  m=2 for
0  i  d  1.
Sieving occurs over the homogeneous polynomials F
1
(x; y) = y
d
f
1
(x=y) and F
2
(x; y) =
x my. The aim for polynomial selection is to choose f
1
and m such that the values F
1
(a; b)
and F
2
(a; b) are simultaneously smooth at many coprime integer pairs (a; b) in the sieving
region. That is, we seek F
1
; F
2
with good yield. Since F
2
is linear, we concentrate on the
choice of F
1
.
There are two factors which inuence the yield of F
1
, size and root properties, so we seek F
1
with a good combination of size and root properties. By size we refer to the magnitude of the
values taken by F
1
. By root properties we refer to the extent to which the distribution of the
roots of F
1
modulo small p
n
, for p prime and n  1, aects the likelihood of F
1
values being
smooth. In short, if F
1
has many roots modulo small p
n
, the values taken by F
1
\behave"
as if they are much smaller than they actually are. That is, on average, the likelihood of
F
1
-values being smooth is increased.
Our search is a two stage process. In the rst stage we generate a large sample of good
polynomials (polynomials with good combinations of size and root properties). In the second
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stage we identify without sieving, the best polynomials in the sample. We concentrate on
skewed polynomials, that is, polynomials f
1
(x) = a
5
x
5
+ : : : + a
0
whose rst few coecients
(a
5
; a
4
and a
3
) are small compared to m, and whose last few coecients (a
2
; a
1
and a
0
) may
be large compared to m. Usually ja
5
j < ja
4
j <    < ja
0
j. To compensate for the last few
coecients being large, we sieve over a skewed region, i.e., a region that is much longer in x
than in y. We take the region to be a rectangle whose width-to-height ratio is s.
The rst stage of the process, generating a sample of polynomials with good yield, has the
following main steps (d = 5):
 Guess leading coecient a
d
, usually with several small prime divisors (for projective
roots).
 Determine initial m from a
d
m
d
 N . If the a
d 1
approximation (N   a
d
m
d
)=m
d 1
is
not close to an integer, try another a
d
. Otherwise use (3.2) to determine a starting f
1
.
 Try to replace the initial f
1
by a smaller one. This numerical optimization step replaces
f
1
(x) by
f
1
(x+ k) + (cx+ d)  (x+ k  m)
and m by m  k, sieving over a region with skewness s. It adjusts four real parameters
c, d, k, s, rounding the optimal values (except s) to integers.
 Make adjustments to f
1
which cause it to have exceptionally good root properties, with-
out destroying the qualities inherited from above. The main adjustment is to consider
integer pairs j
1
; j
0
(with j
1
and j
0
small compared to a
2
and a
1
respectively) for which
the polynomial
f
1
(x) + (j
1
x  j
0
)  (x m)
has exceptionally good root properties modulo many small p
n
. Such pairs j
1
; j
0
are
identied using a sieve-like procedure. For each promising (j
1
; j
0
) pair, we revise the
translation k and skewness s by repeating the numerical optimization on these values
alone.
In the second stage of the process we rate, without sieving, the yields of the polynomial
pairs F
1
; F
2
produced from the rst stage. We use a parameter which quanties the eect of
the root properties of each polynomial. We factor this parameter into estimates of smoothness
probabilities for F
1
and F
2
across a region of skewness s.
At the conclusion of these two stages we perform short sieving experiments on the top-
ranked candidates.
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Results Four of us spent about 100 MIPS years on nding good polynomials for RSA{155.
The following pair, found by Dodson, was used to factor RSA{155:
F
1
(x; y) = 11 93771 38320 x
5
 80 16893 72849 97582 x
4
y
 66269 85223 41185 74445 x
3
y
2
+118168 48430 07952 18803 56852 x
2
y
3
+745 96615 80071 78644 39197 43056 x y
4
 40 67984 35423 62159 36191 37084 05064 y
5
F
2
(x; y) = x  3912 30797 21168 00077 13134 49081 y
with s  10800.
For the purpose of comparison, we give statistics for the above pair similar to those we gave
for the RSA{140 polynomials in [8]. Denote by a
max
the largest ja
i
j for i = 0; : : : ; d. The
un-skewed analogue, F
1
(104x; y=104), of F
1
has a
max
 1:1  10
23
; compared to the typical
case for RSA{155 of a
max
 2:4  10
25
: The un-skewed analogue of F
2
has a
max
 3:8  10
26
:
Hence, F
1
values have shrunk by approximately a factor of 215, whilst F
2
values have grown
by a factor of approximately 16. F
1
has real roots x=y near  11976,  2225, 1584, 12012 and
672167.
With respect to the root properties of F
1
we have a
5
= 2
4
 3
2
 5  11
2
 19  41  1759.
Also, F
1
(x; y) has 20 roots x=y modulo the six primes from 3 to 17 and an additional 33
roots modulo the 18 primes from 19 to 97. As a result of its root properties, F
1
-values have
smoothness probabilities similar to those of random integers which are smaller by a factor of
about 800.
Polynomial Search Time vs. Sieving Time The yield of the pair of polynomials that we
used for RSA{155 is approximately 13.5 times that of a skewed pair of average yield for
RSA{155 (about half of which comes from root properties and the other half from size).
The corresponding gure for the RSA{140 pair is approximately 8 (about a factor of four of
which was due to root properties and the remaining factor of 2 to size). From this we deduce
that, relatively speaking, our RSA{155 selection is approximately 1.7 times \better" than
our RSA{140 selection.
Note that this is consistent with the observed dierences in sieve time. As noted above,
straightforward extrapolation of the asymptotic NFS run-time estimate (2.1) suggests that
sieving for RSA{155 should have taken approximately 7 times the eort of RSA{140. The
actual gure is approximately 4. The dierence can be approximately reconciled by the fact
that the RSA{155 polynomial pair is, relatively, about 1.7 times \better" than the RSA{140
pair.
Another relevant comparison is to the RSA{130 factorization. RSA{130 of course was
factorized without our improved polynomial selection methods. The polynomial pair used
for RSA{130 has a yield approximately 3.2 times that of a random (un-skewed) selection or
RSA{130. Extrapolation of the NFS asymptotic run-time estimate suggests that RSA{140
should have taken about 4 times the eort of RSA{130, whereas the accepted dierence is a
factor of 2. The dierence is close to being reconciled by the RSA{140 polynomial selection
being approximately 2.5 times better than the RSA{130 selection. Finally, to characterize
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the overall improvement accounted for by our techniques, we note that the RSA{155 selection
is approximately 4.2 times better (relatively) than the RSA{130 selection.
Since the root properties of the non-linear polynomials for RSA{140 and RSA{155 are
similar, most of the dierence between them comes about because the RSA{155 selection
is relatively \smaller" than the RSA{140 selection. This in turns comes about because we
conducted a longer search for RSA{155 than we did for the RSA{140 search, so it was more
likely that we would nd good size and good root properties coinciding in the same polyno-
mials. In fact, we spent approximately 100 MIPS years on the RSA{155 search, compared to
60 MIPS years for RSA{140.
Continuing to search for polynomials is worthwhile only as long as the saving in sieve
time exceeds the extra cost of the polynomial search. We have analyzed the \goodness"
distribution of all polynomials generated during the RSA{155 search. Modulo some crude
approximations, the results appear in Table 2. The table shows the expected benet obtained
from  times the polynomial search eort we actually invested (100 MY), for some useful
. The second column gives the change in search time corresponding to the -altered search
eort. The third column gives the expected change in sieve time, calculated from the change
in yield according to our \goodness" distribution. Hence, whilst the absolute benet may
Table 2: Eect of varying the polynomial search time on the sieve time
 change in search change in sieve
time (in MY) time (in MY)
0.2  80 +260
0.5  50 +110
1 0 0
2 +100  110
5 +400  260
10 +900  380
not have been great, it would probably have been worthwhile investing up to about twice
the eort than we did for the RSA{155 polynomial search. We conclude that, in the absence
of further improvements, it is worthwhile using our method to nd polynomials whose yields
are approximately 10{15 times better than a random selection.
3.2 Sieving
Two sieving methods were used simultaneously: lattice sieving and line sieving. This is
probably more ecient than using a single sieve, despite the large percentage of duplicates
found (about 14%, see Section 3.3): both sievers deteriorate as the special q, resp. y (see
below) increase, so we exploited the most fertile parts of both. In addition, using two sievers
oers more exibility in terms of memory: lattice sieving is possible on smaller machines; the
line siever needs more memory, but discovers each relation only once.
The lattice siever xes a prime q, called the special q, which divides F
1
(x
0
; y
0
) for some
known nonzero pair (x
0
; y
0
), and nds (x; y) pairs for which both F
1
(x; y)=q and F
2
(x; y) are
smooth. This is carried out for many special q's. Lattice sieving was introduced by Pollard
[33] and the code we used is the implementation written by Arjen Lenstra and described in
[19, 11], with some additions to handle skewed sieving regions eciently.
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The line siever xes a value of y (from y = 1; 2; : : : up to some bound) and nds values
of x in a given interval for which both F
1
(x; y) and F
2
(x; y) are smooth. The line siever
code was written by Peter Montgomery, with help from Arjen Lenstra, Russell Ruby, Marije
Elkenbracht-Huizing and Stefania Cavallar.
For the lattice sieving, both the rational and the algebraic factor base bounds were chosen
to be 2
24
= 16 777 216. The number of primes was about one million in each factor base.
Two large primes were allowed on each side in addition to the special q input. The reason
that we used these factor base bounds is that we used the lattice sieving implementation from
[19] which does not allow larger factor base bounds. That implementation was written for
the factorization of RSA{130 and was never intended to be used for larger numbers such as
RSA{140, let alone RSA{155. We expect that a rewrite of the lattice siever that would allow
larger factor base bounds would give a much better lattice sieving performance for RSA{155.
Most of the line sieving was carried out with two large primes on both the rational and
the algebraic side. The rational factor base consisted of 2 661 384 primes < 44 000 000 and
the algebraic factor base consisted of 6 304 167 prime ideals of norm < 110 000 000 (including
the seven primes which divide the leading coecient of F
1
(x; y)). Some line sieving allowed
three large primes instead of two on the algebraic side. In that case the rational factor base
consisted of 539 777 primes < 8 000 000 and the algebraic factor base of 1 566 598 prime ideals
of norm < 25 000 000 (including the seven primes which divide the leading coecient of
F
1
(x; y)).
For both sievers the large prime bound 1 000 000 000 was used both for the rational and
for the algebraic primes.
The lattice siever was run for most special q's in the interval [2
24
; 3:0810
8
]. Each special q
has at least one root r such that f
1
(r)  0 mod q. For example, the equation f
1
(x)  0 mod q
has ve roots for q = 83, namely x = 8, 21, 43, 54, 82, but no roots for q = 31. The total
number of special q{root pairs (q; r) in the interval [2
24
; 3:08  10
8
] equals about 15.7M.
Lattice sieving ranged over a rectangle of 8192 by 5000 points per special q{root pair. Taking
into account that we did not sieve over points (x; y) where both x and y are even, this gives
a total of 4:8  10
14
sieving points. With lattice sieving a total of 94.8M relations were
generated at the expense of 26.6 years of CPU time. Averaged over all the CPUs on which
the lattice siever was run, this gives an average of 8.8 CPU seconds per relation. In order to
give an impression of the yield of the lattice siever for dierent special q's, Table 3 shows,
for some selected intervals of lengths 10
6
and 2  10
6
, the number of special q{root pairs,
the number of relations found and the yield in terms of number of relations divided by the
number of special q{root pairs. The yield clearly deteriorates with increasing values of the
special q.
For the line sieving with two large primes on both sides, sieving ranged over the regions
4
:
jxj  1 176 000 000; 1  y  25 000;
jxj  1 680 000 000; 25 001  y  110 000;
jxj  1 680 000 000; 120 001  y  159 000;
4
The somewhat weird choice of the line sieving intervals was made because more contributors chose line
sieving than originally estimated.
3. Factoring RSA{155 11
Table 3: Yield of the lattice siever for selected intervals [v; w] of special q-primes
v=10
6
w=10
6
# special q{ # relations # relations per
root pairs special q{root pair
17 18 59648 667587 11.2
40 41 57410 508123 8.9
70 71 54843 401950 7.3
100 102 109150 708259 6.5
131 133 107211 635619 5.9
170 172 104885 593071 5.7
256 258 103364 509346 4.9
300 302 102617 479220 4.7
and for the line sieving with three large primes instead of two on the algebraic side, the
sieving range was:
jxj  1 680 000 000; 110 001  y  120 000:
Not counting the points where both x and y are even, this gives a total of 3:82 10
14
points
sieved by the line siever. With line sieving a total of 36.0M relations were generated at the
expense of 9.1 years of CPU time. Averaged over all the CPUs on which the line siever was
run, it needed 8:0 CPU seconds to generate one relation. In order to give an impression of
the yield of the line siever for dierent values of y, Table 4 gives, for some selected sieving
regions, the number of relations per y{value. For y between 4 001 and 20 000, this yield clearly
deteriorates with increasing y, but for the larger range of y between 89 001 and 105 000, this
behavior is less obvious.
Sieving was done at twelve dierent locations where a total of 130.8M relations were gen-
erated, 94.8M by lattice sieving and 36.0M by line sieving. Each incoming le was checked
at the central site for duplicates: this reduced the total number of useful incoming relations
to 124.7M. Of these, 88.8M (71%) were found by the lattice siever and 35.9M (29%) by the
line siever. The breakdown of the 124.7M relations (in %) among the twelve dierent sites
5
is given in Table 5.
Calendar time for the sieving was 3.7 months. Sieving was done on about 160 SGI and Sun
workstations (175{400 MHz), on eight R10000 processors (250 MHz), on about 120 Pentium
II PCs (300{450 MHz), and on four Digital/Compaq boxes (500 MHz). The total amount of
CPU-time spent on sieving was 35.7 CPU years.
We estimate the equivalent number of MIPS years as follows. For each contributor, Table 6
gives the number of million relations generated (rounded to two decimals), the number of
CPU days d
s
sieved for this and the estimated average speed s
s
, in million instructions per
seconds (MIPS), of the processors on which these relations were generated. In the last column
we give the corresponding number of MIPS years d
s
s
s
=365. For the time counting on PCs,
we notice that on PCs one usually get real times which may be higher than the CPU times.
Summarizing gives a total of 8360 MIPS years (6570 for lattice and 1790 for line sieving).
For comparison, RSA{140 took about 2000 MIPS years and RSA{130 about 1000 MIPS
5
Lenstra sieved at two sites, viz., Citibank and Univ. of Sydney.
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Table 4: Yield of the line siever for selected sieving regions
x{range y{range # relations
[ 1 176 000 000; 1 175 999 999] [4 001; 6 000] 933 387
[6 001; 8 000] 836 363
[8 001; 10 000] 773 051
[10 001; 12000] 722006
[12 001; 14000] 682597
[14 001; 16000] 651529
[16 001; 18000] 621789
[18 001; 20000] 596953
[ 1 680 000 000; 1 679 999 999] [89 001; 91 000] 391 947
[91 001; 93 000] 377 533
[93 001; 95 000] 374 000
[95 001; 97 000] 370 309
[97 001; 99 000] 385 344
[99 001; 101 000] 362 579
[101 001; 103 000] 358 251
[103 001; 105 000] 354 880
Table 5: Breakdown of sieving contributions
% number of La(ttice) Contributor
CPU days Li(ne)
sieved
20.1 3057 La Alec Muett
17.5 2092 La, Li Paul Leyland
14.6 1819 La, Li Peter L. Montgomery, Stefania Cavallar
13.6 2222 La, Li Bruce Dodson
13.0 1801 La, Li Francois Morain and Gerard Guillerm
6.4 576 La, Li Joel Marchand
5.0 737 La Arjen K. Lenstra
4.5 252 Li Paul Zimmermann
4.0 366 La Je Gilchrist
0.65 62 La Karen Aardal
0.56 47 La Chris and Craig Putnam
years.
A measure of the \quality" of the sieving may be the average number of points sieved to
generate one relation. Table 7 gives this quantity for RSA{140 and for RSA{155, for the
lattice siever and for the line siever. This illustrates that the sieving polynomials were better
for RSA-155 than for RSA{140, especially for the line sieving. In addition, the increase of
the linear factor base bound from 500M for RSA{140 to 1000M for RSA{155 accounts for
some of the change in yield. For RSA{155, the factor bases were much bigger for line sieving
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Table 6: # MIPS years spent on lattice (La) and line (Li) sieving
Contributor # relations # CPU days average speed # MIPS years
sieved of processors
in MIPS
Muett, La 27.46M 3057 285 2387
Leyland, La 19.27M 1395 300 1146
Leyland, Li 4.52M 697 300 573
CWI, La 1.60M 167 175 80
CWI, Li, 2LP 15.64M 1160 210 667
CWI, Li, 3LP 1.00M 492 50 67
Dodson, La 10.28M 1631 175 782
Dodson, Li 7.00M 591 175 283
Morain, La 15.83M 1735 210 998
Morain, Li 1.09M 66 210 38
Marchand, La 7.20M 522 210 300
Marchand, Li 1.11M 54 210 31
Lenstra, La 6.48M 737 210 424
Zimmermann, Li 5.64M 252 195 135
Gilchrist, La 5.14M 366 350 361
Aardal, La 0.81M 62 300 51
Putnam, La 0.76M 47 300 39
than for lattice sieving. This explains the increase of eciency of the line siever compared
with the lattice siever from RSA{140 to RSA{155.
Table 7: Average number of points sieved per relation
lattice siever line siever
RSA{140 1:5 10
6
3:0  10
7
RSA{155 5:1 10
6
1:1  10
7
3.3 Filtering and nding dependencies
The ltering of the data and the building of the matrix were carried out at CWI and took
one calendar month.
Filtering Here we describe the lter strategy which we used for RSA{155. An essential
dierence with the lter strategy used for RSA{140 is that we applied k-way merges (dened
below) with 2  k  8 for RSA{155, but only 2- and 3-way merges for RSA{140.
First, we give two denitions. A relation{set is one relation, or a collection of two or more
relations generated by a merge. A k-way merge (k  2) is the action of combining k relation{
sets with a common prime ideal into k 1 relation{sets, with the purpose of eliminating that
common prime ideal. This is done such that the weight increase is minimal by means of a
minimum spanning tree algorithm [9].
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Among the 124.7M relations collected from the twelve dierent sites, 21.3M duplicates were
found generated by lattice sieving, as well as 17.9M duplicates caused by the simultaneous
use of the lattice and the line siever.
During the rst lter round, only prime ideals with norm > 10M were considered. In
a later stage of the ltering, this 10M-bound was reduced to 7M, in order to improve the
possibilities for merging relations. We added 0.2M free relations for prime ideals of norm >
10M (cf. [17, Section 4, pp. 234{235]). From the resulting 85.7M relations, 32.5M singletons
were deleted, i.e., those relations with a prime ideal of norm > 10M which does not occur in
any other undeleted relation.
We were left with 53.2M relations containing 42.6M dierent prime ideals of norm > 10M.
If we assume that each prime and each prime ideal with norm < 10M occurs at least once,
then we needed to reserve at least (2  
1
120
)(10
7
) excess relations for the primes and the
prime ideals of norm smaller than 10M, where (x) is the number of primes below x. The
factor 2 comes from the two polynomials and the correction factor 1=120 takes account of
the presence of free relations, where 120 is the order of the Galois group of the algebraic
polynomial. With (10
7
) = 664 579 the required excess is about 1.3M relations, whereas we
had 53.2M   42.6M = 10.6M excess relations at our disposal.
In the next merging step 33.0M relations were removed which would have formed the
heaviest relation{sets when performing 2-way merges, reducing the excess from 10.6M to
about 2M relations. So we were still allowed to discard about 2.0M   1.3M = 0.7M relations.
The remaining 20.1M non-free relations
6
having 18.2M prime ideals of norm > 10M were
used as input for the merge step which eliminated prime ideals occurring in up to eight
dierent relation{sets. During this step we looked at prime ideals of norm > 7M. Here, our
approach diers from what we did for RSA{140, where only primes occurring twice or thrice
were eliminated. Applying the new lter strategy to RSA{140 would have resulted in a 30%
smaller (3.3M instead of 4.7M columns) but only 20% heavier matrix than the one actually
used for the factorization of RSA{140 and would have saved 27% on the block Lanczos run
time. The k (k  8) relations were combined into the lightest possible k   1 relation{sets
and the corresponding prime ideal (row in the matrix) was \balanced" (i.e., all entries of
the row were made 0). The overall eect was a reduction of the matrix size by one row and
one column while increasing the matrix weight when k > 2, as described below. We did
not perform all possible merges. We limited the program to only do merges which caused a
weight increase of at most 7 original relations. The merges were done in ascending order of
weight increase.
Since each k-way merge causes an increase of the matrix weight of about (k   2) times
the weight of the lightest relation{set, these merges were not always executed for higher
values of k. For example, 7- and 8-way merges were not executed if all the relation{sets
were already-combined relations. We decided to discard relation{sets which contained more
than 9 relations and to stop merging (and discarding) after 670K relations were discarded.
At this point we should have slightly more columns than rows and did not want to lose any
more columns. The maximum discard threshold was reached during the 10th pass through
the 18.6M prime ideals of norm > 7M, when we allowed the maximum weight increase to
6
The 0.1M free relations are not counted in these 20.1M relations because the free relations are generated
during each lter run.
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be about 6 relations. This means that no merges with weight increase of 7 relations were
executed. The lter program stopped with 6.7M relation sets.
For more details and experiments with RSA{155 and other numbers, see [9].
Finding dependencies From the matrix left after the lter step we omitted the small primes
< 40, thus reducing the weight by 15%. The resulting matrix had 6 699 191 rows, 6 711 336
columns, and weight 417 132 631 (62.27 non{zeros per row). With the help of Peter Mont-
gomery's Cray implementation of the block Lanczos algorithm (cf. [27]) it took 224 CPU
hours and 2 Gbytes of central memory on the Cray C916 at the SARA Amsterdam Academic
Computer Center to nd 64 dependencies among the rows of this matrix. Calendar time for
this job was 9.5 days.
In order to extract from these 64 dependencies some dependencies for the matrix including
the primes < 40, quadratic character checks were used as described in [1], [7, x8, x12.7], and
[16, last paragraph of Section 3.8 on pp. 30{31]. This yielded a dense 100  64 homoge-
neous system which was solved by Gaussian elimination. That system turned out to have 14
independent solutions, which represent linear combinations of the original 64 dependencies.
3.4 The square root step
On August 20, 1999, four dierent square root (cf. [26]) jobs were started in parallel on
four dierent 300 MHz processors of an SGI Origin 2000, each handling one dependency.
One job found the factorization after 39.4 CPU-hours, the other three jobs found the trivial
factorization after 38.3, 41.9, and 61.6 CPU-hours (dierent CPU times are due to the use
of dierent parameters in the four jobs).
We found that the 155{digit number
RSA{155 =
109417386415705274218097073220403576120037329454492059909138421314763499842889n
34784717997257891267332497625752899781833797076537244027146743531593354333897
can be written as the product of two 78-digit primes:
p =
102639592829741105772054196573991675900716567808038066803341933521790711307779
and
q =
106603488380168454820927220360012878679207958575989291522270608237193062808643:
Primality of the factors was proved with the help of two dierent primality proving codes
[4, 10]. The factorizations of p 1 and q  1 are given by
p  1 = 2  607
305999  276297036357806107796483997979900139708537040550885894355659143575473
p+ 1 = 2
2
 3  5
5253077241827  325649100849833342436871870477394634879398067295372095291531269
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q   1 = 2  241
430028152261281581326171  514312985943800777534375166399250129284222855975011
q + 1 = 2
2
 3  130637011
237126941204057  10200242155298917871797  28114641748343531603533667478173
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1. Details of recent absolute and SNFS factoring records
Table 8: Absolute factoring records
# digits 129 130 140 155
method QS GNFS GNFS GNFS
code Gardner RSA{130 RSA{140 RSA{155
factor date Apr 2, Apr 10, Feb 2, Aug 22,
1994 1996 1999 1999
size of p; q 64, 65 65, 65 70, 70 78, 78
sieve time 5000 1000 2000 8400
(in MIPS years)
total sieve time ? ? 8.9 35.7
(in CPU years)
calendar time 270 120 30 110
for sieving (in days)
matrix size 0.6M 3.5M 4.7M 6.7M
row weight 47 40 32 62
Cray CPU hours n.a. 67 100 224
group Internet Internet CABAL CABAL
Table 9: Special Number Field Sieve factoring records
# digits 148[21] 167 180 186 211
code 2,512+ 3,349  12,167+ NEC 10,211 
factor date Jun 15, Feb 4, Sep 3, Sep 15, April 8,
1990 1997 1997 1998 1999
size of p; q 49, 99 80, 87 75, 105 71, 73 93, 118
total sieve time 340
a
? 1.5 5.1 10.9
(in CPU years)
calendar time 83 ? 10 42 64
for sieving (in days)
matrix size 72K ? 1.9M 2.5M 4.8M
row weight dense ? 29 27 49
Cray CPU hours 3
b
? 16 25 121
group Internet NFSNET CWI CWI CABAL
a
MIPS years
b
carried out on a Connection Machine
